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The many outcomes from contracting out: The voice of public 
managers 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that adopting a stakeholder approach to the study of 
contracting outcomes produces more rich and rounded representations of the 
realities of the contracting out of public services. We revisit the research on 
contracting outcomes, highlighting the public manager perspective as key for 
gaining deeper, more detailed insights. The public manager perspective is 
explored in an inductive analysis of answers to open-ended survey questions 
collected from public managers with contracting experience within the context of 
municipal park management in Scandinavia. The emerging managerial 
perspective is summarised in a best-case, worst-case and complex-case scenario 
highlighting the mix, complexities and trade-offs in a composite set of 
contracting outcomes. The nature of contracting outcomes as complex and 
composite rather than unidimensional is one key finding. Furthermore, the 
importance of some specific outcomes (e.g. learning) complements existing 
research themes. Our findings sustain the initial argument, demonstrating how the 
stakeholder approach can produce new insights. A key implication is that future 
research can benefit from assessing contracting outcomes by providing voice to 
multiple stakeholders. 
Keywords 
Contracting out; marketisation; outcomes; public management; qualitative 
analysis; stakeholder 
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Introduction 
Since the 1970s‒80s, contracting out has become a well-established strategy for reforming and 
organising public service delivery in most developed economies as part of New Public 
Management-oriented reforms (Hansen and Lindholst, 2016; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In a 
policy evaluation perspective, long standing key questions for the implementation of contracting 
out, as a particular strategy for privatization and marketization in the public sector, are whether this 
strategy delivers on its ‘promises’ as well as what the ‘broader’ outcomes are (Lundqvist, 1989).  
The literature on contracting outcomes reveals that the current stock of knowledge is 
predominantly based on quantitative approaches and evaluation criteria driven by economic 
perspectives concerned with public expenditures, cost savings and to some degree quality effects – 
a concern tightly aligned with official objectives – or the promises – in most public policies and 
reforms promoting contracting out (Alonso et al., 2017; Bel et al., 2010; Boyne, 1998; Domberger 
and Jensen, 1997; Donahue, 1989; Hansen, 2010b; Hodge, 2000; Petersen et al., 2017). 
However, the predominant approach to the study of contracting outcomes emerges as 
somewhat ‘narrow’ when contrasted with a) the broader range of approaches and criteria of 
potential relevance identified in the general literature on public management and performance 
(Andersen et al., 2016; Boyne, 2002; Hansen, 2017; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Walker and 
Andrews, 2015); b) the few studies that have approached contracting outcomes from alternative 
perspectives, such as citizens’ perceptions (Andrews and Van de Welle, 2013), consequences for 
staff (Vrangbæk et al., 2015), accountability issues (Hodge and Coghill, 2007; Mulgan, 2006), 
challenges for management (Kettl, 2010; Lindholst and Bogetoft, 2011) and the distribution of 
power (Hansen, 2010a); c) studies emphasising the multidimensional and composite characteristics 
of contracting outcomes (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010; Fernandez, 2009; Lindholst, 2017); or d) 
qualitative studies enabling broader narrative accounts (Jones, 2000; Romzek and Johnston, 2002). 
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Furthermore, several authors have highlighted the importance of specifying the stakeholder 
perspective in performance evaluations, as different stakeholder groups represent substantial 
differences in interests, values, insights and worldviews (Davis et al., 2016; Radin, 2006). 
The counterpositions above make clear that the predominant approach leaves us with partial 
and potentially misrepresentative accounts of the range of contracting outcomes of relevance for 
involved key stakeholders (e.g. citizens/tax payers, service users, politicians, public managers, staff, 
private businesses). We therefore argue that the characteristics of and criteria for evaluating 
contracting outcomes must be revisited and conferred beyond the narrow remnants in the 
predominant research perspective in order to advance more ‘rounded’, representative evaluations of 
contracting outcomes. 
In order to gauge the relevance of more rounded approaches, this paper provides an 
exploration of the significant dimensions and characteristics of contracting outcomes from the 
perspective of the public managers, who play a pivotal role in the realisation and delivery of reform 
and policy objectives by implementing contracting out as a particular way of managing and 
organising public service provision. Given their pivotal role in the implementation of contracting 
out as key internal stakeholders (Brown and Potoski, 2003; Davis et al., 2016; Kettl, 2010; 
Lindholst and Bogetoft, 2011), public managers must be expected to hold profound experience and 
detailed insights (albeit still partial) into the contracting outcomes. By adding insights on 
contracting outcomes based on the voices of public managers (as yet another research perspective), 
the paper suggests that research can deliver inputs to evaluations of contracting outcomes. 
The paper studies public managers’ views on contracting outcomes within the context of the 
provision of maintenance services in municipal parks and green spaces – a traditional context for 
the use of contracting out as well as a ‘most likely setting’ for its successful implementation due to 
well-suited key transactional characteristics in terms of relatively low demands for ‘specialised 
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investments’ and a relative ease of ‘measurability’ (Brown and Potoski, 2005; Hefetz and Warner, 
2012). The study relies on a qualitative dataset generated in 2013 on municipal park and green 
space managers’ open assessments of negative and positive outcomes from the contracting out of 
maintenance services in municipal parks and green spaces in the two Scandinavian countries of 
Denmark and Sweden – a context where contracting out has been promoted and become widespread 
since the 1990s (Bretzner et al., 2016; Lindholst et al., 2016). The dataset allows us to explore more 
openly and evaluate the range of contracting outcomes from the viewpoint of public managers who 
are responsible for managing service provision by contracts. In order to advance our overall 
knowledge of contracting outcomes in the public sector, our research is guided by the following 
research question: 
 
How does the range of contracting outcomes perceived as important by public managers compare 
to the range of outcomes highlighted in the literature? 
 
The paper is outlined as follows: First, theories and arguments concerning contracting outcomes in 
the public sector are reviewed. Second, our data and research methods are described, including a 
short description of the study’s context. Third, key findings from our study are presented. Fourth, 
the findings are discussed and compared to current knowledge. Finally, a brief conclusion 
summarises our findings and puts them into perspective. 
Public managers and contracting outcomes revisited 
A reading of the key literature on contracting out highlights how several conceptualisations of 
contracting outcomes are available. Overall, research interests in contracting outcomes in the 
private delivery of public services have ranged from a narrow, unidimensional focus on economic 
performance (e.g. Boyne, 1998; Hodge, 2000; Petersen et al., 2017) to broader multidimensional 
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performance foci, such as various forms of ‘contract accountability’ and different types of outcomes 
and impacts (e.g. Amirkhanyan et al., 2007; Andrews and Van de Welle, 2013; Fernandez, 2009; 
Lindholst, 2017; Romzek and Johnston, 2005). While some scholars (e.g. Hodge, 2000) have 
provided summaries and discussions of different types of outcomes, no authoritative lists of 
contracting outcomes are readily available. Over the years, most of the studies and systematic 
reviews have explored contracting outcomes, with a predominantly policy-driven interest in 
economic outcomes related to expenditure levels and cost savings, and to some degree addressed 
quality issues (Alonso et al., 2017; Bel et al., 2010; Boyne, 1998; Domberger and Jensen, 1997; 
Donahue, 1989; Hodge, 2000; Petersen et al., 2017). A few studies have studied and discussed 
problems with the quality of privately produced services more independently through the concept of 
‘accountability’ (e.g. Hodge and Coghill, 2007; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2010; Mulgan, 2006). In the 
predominant economic perspective, however, other outcomes are often discussed as moderating 
effects or externalities rather than unique outcomes of inherent interest and value. This is the case in 
discussions of ‘quality shading’ effects (e.g. Hart et al. 1997) or ‘transaction costs’ as moderating 
effects on direct cost savings (e.g. Alonso et al., 2017; Hodge, 2000). However, from a managerial 
perspective, as highlighted by Lindholst and Bogetoft (2011) and O’Flynn and Alford (2008), it 
also becomes clear that activities associated with the transaction costs of contracting out (preparing, 
procuring and monitoring contracts) and the required organisational changes represent a 
fundamentally different way of managing public service delivery – imbued with a different set of 
challenges, advantages and disadvantages – compared to bureaucratic modes of service delivery 
based on internal organisational routines and professional expertise. The implementation of 
contracting out is intrinsically associated with substantial changes in the organisations wherein 
public managers operate, entailing change in organisational structures, governing values and 
cultural outlook through shifts from bureaucratic modes of service provision to market-based modes 
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(Hood, 1991; 1998). Key features of organisational change include the disaggregation of former 
‘monolithic’ hierarchies into clearly demarcated and separate ‘purchaser’/‘provider’ roles, each 
with greater autonomy, greater focus on organisational output and efficiency rather than common 
goal settings together with a shift in cultural outlook from a collectivistic mind-set towards an 
individualistic mind-set. Likewise, Patterson and Pinch (1995) observed that the radical British 
approach to contracting out in the 1990s entailed a shift towards ‘strategic centralisation’ and 
‘operational decentralisation’ together with the emergence of a ‘business’ culture in public 
organisations. Organisational changes have impacted the conditions and responsibilities for public 
management, and research has identified key managerial outcomes. O’Flynn and Alford (2008 
highlighted a dilemma between the requirements to separate organisational responsibilities and 
those for accessing sufficient knowledge for well-working contract management as one key 
outcome for public management. Likewise, the employees in public-service-providing organisations 
have been found to be impacted significantly by the implementation of contracting out by, for 
example, adverse changes in employment rates and terms (Vrangbæk et al., 2015. The impact of 
contracting has also been discussed from the viewpoint of broader governance perspectives. Rhodes 
(1994) discussed whether the shift towards contracts in public service delivery would limit the 
scope for political and democratic decision-making and suggested a ‘hollowing out’ hypothesis. 
Congruently, Hodge (2000) provided short overviews and discussions on the ‘democratic’, ‘legal’ 
and ‘political’ performance of privatisation (including contracting out) in the public sector. In brief, 
the major types of contracting outcomes highlighted in the literature revisited above can be 
subsumed under headings for economic, service, managerial, organisational, employment and 
governance outcomes. However, the predominant approach and most research have entailed a 
narrow, unidimensional interest in economic outcomes. 
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 Beyond the literature on contracting out, a general literature on performance in relation to 
public management and the public sector has developed more systematic, general approaches to 
conceptualisations of performance and identifying evaluation criteria of potential interest (e.g. 
Andersen et al., 2016; Boyne, 2002; Hansen, 2017; Walker et al., 2015). Working with the 3E 
(economy, efficiency and effectiveness) and IOO (input-output-outcome) models, Boyne (2002) 
developed a set of five main ‘performance domains’ related to ‘outputs’, ‘efficiency’, ‘service 
outcomes’, ‘responsiveness’ and ‘democratic outcomes’, which were further divided into 15 
‘subdomains’. Similarly, Hansen (2017) identified a general list of six commonly used 
(‘institutionalised’) performance criteria – ‘economy’, ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘equity and 
fairness’, ‘responsiveness’ and ‘quality’ – which must be evaluated from particular ‘points of 
references’. Scholars have emphasised that outcomes are multidimensional, can (or must) be viewed 
from the perspective of multiple stakeholders, are difficult to measure due to inherent measurement 
errors in both objective and subjective measures, and involve long and somehow uncertain causal 
chains (Boyne et al., 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Given that reliance on ‘objective’ 
performance measures have become challenged and reliance on ‘narrow’ performance 
measurements have become ‘risky’, shifts have been warranted towards approaches acknowledging 
the inherent subjectivity in performance measures and openings towards the perspectives of 
multiple stakeholders (Brewer, 2006; Cuganesan et al., 2014; Radin, 2006 Schachter, 2010). Indeed, 
concepts like ‘performance’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ are value-laden and their relevance and 
content vary across various stakeholders. In order to provide a systematic conceptual approach 
beyond lists of performance criteria used for evaluations in various settings, Andersen et al. (2016) 
proposed a framework for capturing conceptualisations of performance based on distinctions 
between questions related to ‘stakeholders’, ‘formality’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘type of processes’, ‘type of 
products’ and ‘unit of analysis’. Clearly, any list of relevant criteria is seldom complete or fully 
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comprehensive. Consequently, it is stressed that the relevance of any list of criteria adopted for 
performance evaluations must be justified against context and research interests. 
What is left from the perspective of the research on contracting out is to identify and further 
specify the range of outcomes (e.g. domains, institutionalised criteria, distinctions) by varying 
interests. One key question in this endeavour is to acknowledge the stakeholder perspective and 
explore what can be gained from including this. Public managers responsible for service provision 
contracted out to private service providers are key stakeholders and play pivotal roles when 
implementing contracting out, as they are routinely involved in the practicalities of contracting 
decisions (Brown and Potoski, 2003; Yang et al. 2009; Lindholst and Bogetoft, 2011; Davis et al., 
2016). They are involved in developing and preparing tender and contract materials, carrying out 
procurement processes, evaluating tenders, overseeing contracts and monitoring private contractor 
service delivery. Public managers are also responsible for ensuring that policy and financial 
objectives are achieved and can be involved in the development of contracting policies and 
decisions (Nuppenau, 2009). The introduction of contracting out in the public sector has required 
public managers to learn and assume new roles. Kettl (1993) highlighted the need for public 
managers to become ‘smart buyers’ by learning to address the most fundamental contracting 
questions (e.g. ‘what to buy’, ‘from whom to buy’, ‘what has been bought’). Similarly, theory has 
emphasised how organising economic exchange through contracts entails needs for developing 
competitive markets (public choice theory) and investing in and implementing in sturdy instruments 
in terms of information systems (agency theory) and ‘safeguards’ (transaction cost theory) in order 
to ensure contractual compliance and mitigate contractual hazards and risks. More generally, these 
functions have been considered part of a set of contracting capabilities encompassing the 
assessment of feasibility, implementation and evaluation of contracting out (Brown and Potoski, 
2003). 
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Due to their pivotal role(s) in the implementation of contracting out, public managers can be 
anticipated to hold deep, detailed insight into the positive and negative impacts of implementation. 
This insight can be anticipated to cover the predominant focus on finance and service quality, go 
beyond such focus and encompass impacts on management itself and the organisations wherein 
management operates on a daily basis as well as diverging from the perspective of other key 
stakeholders (policymakers, service staff, citizens). 
Materials and methods 
Context of study 
The study is couched within the context of the provision of maintenance services in municipal parks 
and green spaces in Denmark and Sweden. Within an urban environment, such spaces are integrated 
parts of a larger green infrastructure, which provides a range of urban functions of social, economic 
and environmental value (MEA, 2005). In this context, proper maintenance service management 
and delivery is essential for the upkeep and development of the value and multi-functionality of 
urban parks and green spaces (Dempsey and Burton, 2012). Financially, however, spending on park 
services represents a minor fraction of total public expenditures in the two countries. According to 
national statistic bureaus, less than 1% of total local government service expenditures in each 
country in 2015 was spent on public parks, green spaces and other outdoor recreational areas 
(author’s own calculations). 
Compared to other local government services, parks maintenance can be regarded as a ‘most 
likely setting’ for the implementation of contracting out due to well-suited transactional 
characteristics in terms of relatively low demands for ‘specialised investments’ and the ease of 
‘measurability’, also expressed as low levels of ‘contracting difficulties’ (Brown and Potoski, 2005; 
Hefetz and Warner, 2012). The two Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Sweden represent 
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‘almost similar’ institutional contexts, where contracting out at an early stage has been promoted 
and developed by a pragmatic policy push within a decentralised institutional structure (Bryntse and 
Greve, 2002). Consequently, contracting out has become a common institutional arrangement 
implemented by the mid-2010s by most local governments in both countries for providing park and 
green space maintenance services. Bretzner et al. (2016) reported that 54% of Swedish 
municipalities used private park maintenance to some degree, while Lindholst et al. (2016) reported 
that 81% of Danish municipalities used some measure of private services. In both countries, the 
most common arrangement for service provision was found to be a private/public mix. Given the 
respective histories with the contracting out of park maintenance in Sweden and Denmark, both 
countries should provide ample experiences with contracting out. 
Data collection 
Our analysis relies on a qualitative dataset generated by an open-ended question in a self-
administered web-based survey distributed in 2013 to all of the municipal departments responsible 
for park and green space management in Denmark and Sweden. The survey was designed and 
distributed to explore the range of outcomes from contracting out municipal park and green space 
maintenance as perceived by the responsible public managers. Key respondents in both countries 
were identified from membership lists for professional associations as well as information on 
municipal websites. The professional associations in Denmark and Sweden were ‘Municipal Park 
and Nature Managers’ [Kommunale Park- og Naturforvaltere] and the ‘Association for Swedish 
City Gardeners’ [Föreningen Sveriges Stadsträdgårdsmästare], respectively. Key selection criteria 
for respondents were a position as mid-level manager within the overall municipal hierarchy 
combined with a key position in a department responsible for parks and green space services – 
characteristics commonly entailing responsibilities for and insights into strategic and operational 
domains of service delivery. Within the municipal hierarchy, these are often mid-level managers 
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overseeing one or two layers of lower-level managers and with direct reference to top-level 
managers on the municipal board. They are usually also responsible for representing the 
administrative level in relations with the political level. 
Within municipal organisations, the strategic and operational management of parks and 
green spaces is integrated to some degree with road services. Given the municipal profile and 
organisation, strategic and/or operational responsibilities for parks are possibly integrated within a 
‘road department’ or joint ‘road and park’ department. Typical job titles, somewhat difficult to 
translate, were ‘chief park officer’ [parkchef], ‘chief road officer’ [vejchef], or ‘head city gardener’ 
[stadsgartner/stadsträdgårdsmästar] – the historical title for the highest ranked administrative 
officer within park administrations in Denmark and Sweden. 
The survey consisted of a few questions (nine items in total) related to whether the 
municipality contracted out green space maintenance, the use of legal frameworks, the historical, 
current and expected contracting levels as well as an open-ended question inviting the respondents 
to evaluate, in their own words, respectively, any positive and/or negative outcomes from 
contracting out green space maintenance. The differentiation of evaluations into positive and 
negative outcomes corresponds to the conceptualisation of contracting performance proposed by 
Amirkhanyan et al. (2007). The question on outcomes was (translated from Danish and Swedish): 
‘What do you think is positive and negative about using public procurement for maintenance 
services within outdoor area management?’ ‘Outdoor area’ is often used by practitioners in the 
municipal park sector to denote various types of spaces (parks, playgrounds, sports fields, wooded 
areas). The respondents could write their answers in two separate boxes: one for negative outcomes 
and one for positive outcomes. While open-ended questions are not usually regarded as the most 
optimal data source from surveys, they sometimes have advantages over closed questions. In 
particular, they can provide unexpected answers, reveal the ‘real’ views of respondents more 
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closely and enable respondents to answer questions in their own words (Fowler, 2009). 
 An initial screening of the final data provided rich material ranging from entries with 
detailed accounts of various contracting outcomes to entries with lists of key outcomes. The length 
of accounts and topics varied. The total length of the data material available for analysis 
encompassed 3,800 words. Usable entries from a total of 62 municipalities with contracting out 
experience, including 26 Swedish and 36 Danish municipalities, were available for further analysis. 
Based on self-reported data for contracting levels, the 62 municipalities comprise almost even 
distributions of municipalities for each country, with small-scale contracting (≤ 20%), medium-
scale contracting (20‒70%) and large-scale contracting out (≥ 70%). However, these 62 
municipalities tend to represent larger municipalities within the two countries, particularly for 
Sweden (see the appendix for further details). 
Data analysis 
We combined qualitative and simple quantitative techniques for the data analysis using the Nvivo 
software package for qualitative analysis. A grounded theory-inspired inductive approach (Glaser 
and Strauss, 2006) combined with template analysis (Brooks et al., 2015; King, 2004) was adopted 
for data analysis, which generated a substantive account in the sense that it corresponds closely to 
the realities of managers working with contracting out (and be understandable by them). 
An initial template for analysis was set up with the categories (codes) for outcomes derived 
from the reviewed contracting literature, including the domains in the final template related to 
‘economic’, ‘service’, ‘managerial’ and ‘organisational’ outcomes. Outcomes related to broader 
political and democratic perspectives were not recorded in the data set (and therefore excluded from 
the final template). The structure of the collected data allowed us to differentiate the reported 
outcomes according to country context, scale of contracting, size of municipality and 
positive/negative outcomes. The four main codes in the final template could be used immediately 
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for data organisation and interpretation. When developing the template, a range of sub-codes for 
each main code emerged. Here, the survey data were recursively coded in conjunction with 
revisions of the template. Table 1 reports our final template, including background codes, the main 
code and sub-codes (including text examples). The main and sub-codes in the final template 
covered almost all of the text in the data. Some instances could also be interpreted as relevant for 
more than one outcome. For example, activities related to a perceived increase in transactions costs 
could be interpreted as both an economic outcome (e.g. increasing monitoring activities has 
economic costs) and a managerial outcome in terms of a change in the content of management 
work. These instances are discussed in the result section below. 
 
*** Insert table 1 around here *** 
 
 In order to gauge the importance of the various outcomes among the managers in our data 
set, we undertook a simple quantitative content analysis inspired by Bryman (2012) by summarising 
the frequencies of the instances of the coded outcomes (see Table 2 in the result section). Some 
outcomes were clearly reported more frequently than others, and we interpreted the presence of a 
higher number of instances as reflecting the saliency of an outcome in the corresponding group of 
cases. Conversely, we regarded outcomes of less/no salience if they were briefly reported only once 
or a few times. Table 2 reveals how, at the main-code level, all main outcomes can be regarded as 
salient to some degree as defined above except for ‘positive service outcomes’. 
 
Findings 
Table 2 provides an overview of the frequencies for all outcomes (at the main-codes and sub-code 
levels) found in the dataset. Most instances are recorded for economic outcomes (92 instances), 
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while the fewest instances (24) are recorded for service outcomes. The reported outcomes are 
explored and discussed in further detail in separate sections below. The content and characteristics 
of the outcomes are illuminated by (translated) quotes from the managers. The country context (DK 
and S), scale of contracting (small, medium or large, as defined above) and municipality size 
(nearest 10,000) are indicated for each quote. 
 
*** insert table 2 around here *** 
 
An assessment (not shown) of the frequencies of reported outcomes against country context (DK 
and S) and scale of contracting (small, medium and large) found no major skewnesses. For 
example, around 30% of the municipalities in each country reported on service outcomes, while 
some 80% reported on economic outcomes The only notable difference between context and 
reported outcomes was for scale of contracting and the frequency of reported economic outcomes, 
where the group with small-scale contracting had a higher frequency of reported economic 
outcomes (approx. 85%) compared to the group with large-scale contracting (approx. 70%). 
Economic outcomes 
Table 2 provides an overview of reported economic outcomes in the dataset. ‘Price/cost levels’ 
relates to the impact of cost levels on contracted-out services (24 instances). ‘Transaction costs’ 
(21) relates to ex-ante and ex-post activities and organisational resources spent on managing 
contracting processes. These activities can also be seen as impacting management, particularly in 
terms of changes in management focus (see section on managerial outcomes below). In our 
analysis, ‘accountability’ (28 instances) – in this case economic – relates to whether transparency 
and information levels on the cost and price of maintenance services have been affected by 
contracting out. In particular, managers must prove (to their principals, i.e. politicians) that they 
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have arranged service delivery systems in economically efficient ways. Benchmarks from 
competitive market pricing (i.e. contestability) have become one standard for documenting this. 
‘Resource use’ (21) relates to whether contracting out affects the use of machinery and expertise. 
Overall, positive economic outcomes (57 instances) primarily relate to reduced price/cost 
levels (16), economic accountability primarily due to improved transparency on price/cost levels 
(22) and, finally, access to and more effective use of resources in the form of specialised and 
expensive machinery and expertise (19). 
The many positive outcomes for price/cost levels were stated in terms such as, ‘maintenance 
costs have fallen compared to in-house operations’ (S, medium-scale, 120,000), ‘a lot of money has 
been saved’ (DK, large-scale, 50,000), ‘reduced costs – it’s more cost-effective’ (S, medium-scale, 
140,000), ‘it costs less’ (S, large-scale, 130,000), ‘overall reduction in costs’ (DK, medium-scale, 
30,000) or plainly ‘savings’ (DK, large-scale, 50,000). Moreover, the positive outcomes regarding 
resource use can be seen as a special case of how service costs are reduced. This type of outcome 
was described in various ways, such as ‘We get to purchase expertise and machinery we don’t have 
ourselves and from which an external provider can get a better economy’ (S, small-scale, 80,000); 
‘You can contract out those tasks where the machine park is not effective enough’ (DK, medium-
scale, 60,000); or ‘They [external providers] have greater expertise with special tasks, such as 
forestry, so they do the job quicker and cheaper than when organized in-house’ (DK, small-scale, 
40,000). In-house service provision requires specialised expertise and/or machinery and will be 
excessive costly if only needed occasionally. Improved economic accountability was another major 
outcome with several characteristics. Examples related to economic accountability ranged from 
improved financial management due to increased transparency on cost levels, such as, ‘It has 
become easier to keep the budgets as everything is calculated and we got fixed prices on all types of 
jobs’ (S, large-scale, 70,000) or ‘Citizens and politicians cannot criticise the administration for 
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having (too) high costs for the provision of maintenance, as they had been exposed to public tender 
and it has been established that they cost what they cost” (DK, medium-scale, 30,000) to examples 
related to comparisons between internal and external provision of services, such as, ‘To have 
[maintenance of] areas contracted out alongside other areas with in-house maintenance gives a good 
opportunity to compare cost and quality’ (DK, small-scale, 100,000). Overall, the data supports the 
interpretation that ‘competition’ or ‘benchmarking’ against private contractors was used to show 
political peers that the overall service delivery arrangement was economically sound. 
Moreover, some negative outcomes were related to a lack of accountability about whether 
services were provided as agreed (six instances). These concerns were formulated in statements like 
‘It isn’t very transparent whether we get the service we order’ (DK, small-scale, 70,000), ‘Some 
[external providers] strive to deliver less than agreed’ (DK, small-scale, 40,000), or ‘We’re 
suspicious about fraud’ (S, large-scale, 150,000). The reports on failing accountability can also 
support a negative interpretation of the impact from contracting out on service outcomes (also see 
below). 
Further negative economic outcomes relate to increased cost levels for some types of 
services (eight instances) and increases in administrative activities and responsibilities due to the 
management of contractors, i.e. transaction costs (21). The prospects for increased costs were stated 
in terms such as, ‘Money becomes “king” and it’s really costly even if we only want a “little extra” 
done’ (S, medium-scale, 110,000) or ‘Not everything can be described in advance and, thus, ad hoc 
works become expensive’ (DK, large-scale, 110,000). The increase in administrative activities 
owed to paperwork, the elaboration of service and work specifications, and monitoring functions. 
These ‘cost bearing’ activities could range from routine management activities like ‘It’s necessary 
to carry out more control – and money must be allocated for this’ (DK, small-scale, 70,000), 
‘Preparing a tender is a big job’ (S, small-scale, 90,000), ‘[Contracting out] requires extensive 
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tender materials, and it costs a lot of money and time to put services out on tender’ (DK, small-
scale, 50,000) to more ‘demanding’ or ‘failing’ cases, such as ‘A poorly performing contractor is 
incredibly time-demanding and expensive to deal with’ (S, small-scale, 80,000) or ‘Terminating a 
contract also costs a lot’ (DK, medium-scale, 50,000). Some also questioned whether lower service 
provision costs were offset by increased transaction costs: ‘[It’s a] big job to contract out, but does 
the administration – including procurement, service specification and quality control – not 
overshadow eventual cost savings on the provided work?’ (DK, medium-scale, 60,000). 
According to our findings, a trade-off in economic accountability may exist between 
transparent price/cost levels and decreased service quality transparency. Similarly, a trade-off in 
cost/price levels for different types of maintenance services could be identified. This trade-off 
becomes clear in the comment, ‘A good work description ensures work well done for a fixed low 
price, but not all work can be described in advance and ad hoc works become expensive’ (DK, 
large-scale, 110,000). 
Service outcomes 
An overview of reported service outcomes is provided in Table 2. ‘Quality of maintenance’ (16 
instances) relates to the effect on quality in provided maintenance; ‘Citizen feedback’ (four) relates 
to the effects on the feedback from citizens to management; ‘Development of areas’ (three) relates 
to reported effects on area development; and ‘Social services’ (one) relates to public service 
provision going beyond the green space maintenance itself. 
There were only four instances of positive service outcomes. The few positive service 
outcomes related to higher, more consistent service quality and situations where savings are re-
invested in area development. Far more instances of service outcomes are negative (20 instances), 
including problems with low quality (13) and increased citizen complaints due to low quality (4). 
Quality issues were stated in common terms (e.g. ‘failing quality in provided work’, ‘poorer 
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quality’). Quality levels for services provided by private contractors were also compared directly to 
the in-house service quality: ‘An in-house provider is more flexible and may feel very responsible 
for the areas, meaning you get “that little extra” external contractors wouldn’t do because they have 
very different profit requirements’ (S, medium-scale, 40,000). Other instances reported in the 
dataset further explain what ‘that little extra’ is about: ‘The contractors lack a “holistic view” and 
pass on work that obviously must be done – and don’t report it’ (S, medium-scale, 20,000), ‘Only 
the most necessary work is done’ (S, large-scale, 140,000) or ‘Contractors lack sensitivity towards 
citizens’ (DK, medium-scale, 60,000). 
Furthermore, declining quality was sometimes associated with low contract pricing; e.g. 
‘The price “determines”, meaning that the best for the job rarely wins the contract’ (S, small-scale, 
90,000) or ‘Procurements often coincide with savings on the areas, meaning a permanent quality 
reduction (DK, large-scale, 200,000)’. This indicates a trade-off between contract pricing and 
quality. Overall, the relatively low frequency of reported service outcomes suggests that effects on 
service levels are not experienced as salient to the same extent as, for example, economic or 
management effects. Please note, however, that most instances are negative evaluations that are 
related to negative effects on service quality. An overall negative slant when interpreting service 
outcomes is sustained by reports of decreased transparency regarding the quality of services 
provided by private contractors. 
 
Managerial outcomes 
Table 2 provides an overview of reported managerial outcomes in the dataset (85 instances). 
‘Managerial effectiveness’ (42) relates to whether managers can effectively manage their 
maintenance responsibilities through contracts; ‘Managerial focus’ (20) relates to whether the 
attention in managerial tasks changes due to contracting out; and ‘Management information’ (18) 
relates to whether information required for managing maintenance effectively changes due to the 
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use of contracting. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the outcomes related to economic 
accountability can be interpreted as improvements or impediments of a particular kind of 
information available to managers. The instances below are ‘merely’ related to changes in formal 
planning systems (e.g. improved area registration). 
Most notable is the relatively high frequency of instances for outcomes related to 
‘managerial effectiveness,’ particularly the negative outcomes (27 instances). First, on the positive 
side, improved effectiveness is reported in various ways. In particular, the traditional managerial 
task of carrying out activities as planned is noted as becoming easier: ‘You get what you order’ 
(DK, small-scale, 90,000); ‘You can get rid of a provider who doesn’t deliver and it’s easier to 
impose fines’ (S, medium-scale, 140,000); and management tasks related to setting priorities and 
defining what should be done, such as ‘When you manage by contracts you can decide 100% on 
maintenance levels in contrast to the management of in-house provisions, where decisions on 
resource use and quality levels are to some degree delegated to the personnel in the field’ (DK, 
small-scale, 100,000). On the negative side, effectiveness was impeded by perceived rigidity in 
contracts, as expressed in statements such as, ‘We can’t just adjust the level of work or service 
levels’ (DK, medium-scale, 50,000); ‘Reaction time is slower’ (DK, medium-scale, 60,000); or 
‘stiff procedures for collaboration’ (DK, large-scale, 70,000); as well as impeded by inadequate 
internal managerial resources for appropriate contract management, expressed in phrases/statements 
like ‘Insufficient resources for control and documentation’ (S, large-scale, 150,000) or ‘The public 
sector often doesn’t have sufficient resources to carry out control and documentation’ (DK, small-
scale, 40,000). 
The outcomes of the overall ‘managerial focus’ were also ambiguous. On the negative side 
(12 instances), management was ‘burdened,’ especially with a focus on monitoring as a negative 
activity. For example: ‘A lot of follow-ups to ensure the required maintenance’ (DK, small-scale, 
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80,000); ‘Continuous follow-up and quality control is needed’ (S, large-scale, 70,000); ‘Control 
instead of visions’ (S, small-scale, 80,000). Moreover, a loss of holistic perspective was associated 
with private-contractor maintenance operations: ‘They [private contractors] pass on work that 
obviously must be done and don’t report it’ (S, medium-scale, 20,000). On the positive side (eight 
instances), managerial focus was improved by a clearer focus on strategic and operational planning 
and less focus on issues related to the management of personnel and investments in machinery: 
‘Problems with machinery or staff are not relevant for the purchaser [us]’ (DK, large-scale, 
110,000); ‘It’s simpler to be a purchaser to a private contractor – you don’t have field staff that 
takes up a lot of time’ (S, large-scale, 70,000). 
Information required for management was improved in various ways (12 instances). In 
particular, information levels were improved by introducing and updating standards for 
maintenance operations and quality levels, area registrations and the financial implications of 
various management decisions and the overview over operations. For example: ‘Procurement 
processes give oversight over areas, work and quality’ (DK, medium-scale, 60,000); ‘As the client-
side, we’re continuously required to have our registrations, maps etc. updated’ (DK, small-scale, 
40,000); ‘You’re required to reflect upon and specify which standards you want’ (S, large-scale, 
50,000). Most instances of positive outcomes on information levels seem associated with improved 
formal knowledge systems stored in systems for area registrations, geographical information 
systems (GIS) and service standards. On the negative side (six instances), a loss of important 
information for effective management was stated repeatedly. These outcomes relate to less contact 
with key stakeholders (operational staff, citizens): ‘As managers, we don’t work as closely to the 
field personnel and have to go through a work leader as contact’ (S, large-scale, 70,000); ‘Less 
contact between the municipality and citizens in the daily work’ (S, large-scale, 150,000). While the 
positive outcomes on information levels seem associated with formal information, the negative 
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outcomes on information levels seem to be associated with a loss in informal, ad hoc information 
given through day-to-day contact with operational personnel or citizens. 
 
Organisational outcomes 
Table 2 provides an overview of reported organisational outcomes in the dataset. ‘Staff’ (five 
instances) relates to outcomes for staff within the public organisation related to contracting out; 
‘knowledge’ (32) relates to the outcome of the maintenance and development of the organisational 
knowledgebase due to contracting out; ‘motivation’ (three) relates to changes in incentives; and 
‘quality of relations’ (22) relates to the outcomes from the client–contractor relationships. 
The majority of outcomes related to ‘knowledge’ were positive (18 instances). In several 
instances, contracting out was associated with learning opportunities in which the knowledge of or 
ideas for improved routines, methods, processes and/or how to undertake specialised tasks were 
transferred from private contractors to public clients or became available through contractual 
relations. This outcome was expressed in numerous statements and phrases: ‘New ideas and mind-
sets’ (S, small-scale, 90,000); ‘New methods and new perspectives on how to do the work’ (DK, 
small-scale, 80,000); ‘Easier introduction to new routines and ideas’ (S, large-scale, 150,000); 
‘Adding knowledge to our organisation’ (DK, small-scale, 40,000); ‘Contractors bring fresh eyes 
and experiences from other municipalities’ (DK, medium-scale, 30,000). Fear of losing knowledge 
is another major negative outcome (14 outcomes), especially related to staff losing knowledge about 
parks and green spaces (as purchaser and provider alike): ‘Knowledge of maintenance operations 
disappears due to huge staff turnover’ (DK, medium-scale, 30,000); ‘The contractor doesn’t have 
the same detailed knowledge about the areas as in-house staff’ (S, medium-scale, 100,000). Another 
major negative outcome concerns the ‘quality of relations,’ indicating that, eventually, well-
functioning, continuous relationships between management and those carrying out maintenance 
operations are somehow lost when contracting out and more difficult to develop within time-limited 
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contractual relations. The negative outcome for the quality of relations was expressed in statements 
such as, ‘Disagreement about what is contained in the contract’ (DK, medium-scale, 40,000); ‘It 
takes time to build up well-functioning collaborative relations with a contractor, which can be 
difficult with a short-term contract’ (S, medium-scale, 100,000); ‘poor continuity’ (S, medium-
scale, 100,000); ‘typically opposing interests’ (DK, medium-scale, 90,000). Note also that the 
dataset contains very few instances related to outcomes for ‘staff’ and ‘motivations’. These 
instances related to negative outcomes, like general insecurity and deteriorating employment terms 
stated in phrases such as, ‘The in-house staff is always threatened that they can be contracted out. I 
wouldn’t like it myself’ (DK, small-scale, 90,000) or ‘There are problems with ensuring the terms 
of the contract, e.g., wage levels and employment conditions’ (DK, medium-scale, 30,000). Positive 
outcomes for staff were not recorded at all in the data. 
Contracting outcomes between two extremes 
Based on the reported outcomes, our findings can be summarised in three different scenarios: A 
best-case scenario (one end of a continuum) summarises all of the positive outcomes and captures 
the best of the promises of contracting out (as one extreme), whereas a worst-case scenario 
summarises all of the negative outcomes and captures the pitfalls and drawbacks of contracting out 
(the other end of the continuum). Not representing any specific, real case, these two scenarios 
instead summarise the lists of positive and negative outcomes recorded in our dataset. Between 
these two extremes, a complex-case scenario represents a set of numerous trade-offs and mixes of 
contracting outcomes that are likely to accrue when contracting out is implemented across a group 
of local governments. Table 3 provides an overview of the three scenarios. 
 
*** Insert table 3 around here *** 
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The best-case scenario is characterised by cost savings and improved technical efficiency and 
economic accountability, access to externally provided specialised expertise, improved strategic and 
operational management as well as a more effective management, innovation and improved 
organisational routines and work methods. The worst-case scenario is characterised by 
declining/failing quality in service provisions, increased overall costs, inflexible service provision, 
overly expensive costs for adjustments, increased and costly efforts for monitoring, loss of key 
knowledge about services for planning and management, and ongoing and burdensome disputes 
with contractors, uncertainty for in-house staff as well as poor collaborative relations. Between the 
two extremes is a scenario describing contracting outcomes as a mix of negative and positive 
outcomes as well as a set of trade-offs. 
The illumination of the complexities related to outcomes at the aggregate sector level is a 
key finding in our analysis. Accountability for price/cost levels might be enhanced while 
accountability on service quality is simultaneously reduced; costs of standard operations are 
reduced while non-standard operations become more expensive; contract management becomes 
more effective but limited by a lack of internal resources; or knowledge within an organisation on 
maintenance operations is lost while collaborating with private contractors produces new 
knowledge. 
Discussions 
Our study generally highlights the importance of integrating more multidimensional understandings 
of the outcomes from contracting out than implied by the (albeit important) focus of the dominant 
perspective focus on costs and quality. Our study thus restates the importance of earlier research 
emphasising the multidimensional characteristics of contracting outcomes (e.g. Fernandez, 2009; 
Lindholst, 2017). Our study finds important positive outcomes worth highlighting, including 
particular economic outcomes in terms of improved economic accountability, cost levels and 
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resource use, some managerial and organisational outcomes in terms of improved information 
levels, learning and knowledge, as well as managerial effectiveness. Given the balance in the 
recorded economic outcomes, our study particularly tends to support reported findings on cost 
reduction for technical services (e.g. Hodge, 2000). Several negative aspects are also highlighted. In 
particular, quality issues, transaction costs, burdensome contractual relations, impeded managerial 
effectiveness and lack of flexibility are among the key drawbacks. Given the balance in the reported 
service outcomes, our study tends to support findings in earlier studies highlighting a range of 
accountability (quality) issues when private contractors provide services (e.g. Lamothe and 
Lamothe, 2010; Romzek and Johnson, 2005). It should be noted that the frequencies of instances of 
various outcomes recorded in the dataset are only indicative of the overall balance, as the dataset 
does not evaluate the relative importance (weight) of the various outcomes (e.g. prospective cost 
savings may still render contracting out more favourable for local authorities than alternative modes 
of service provision despite managerial and organisational drawbacks). 
Importantly, our study highlights outcomes related to knowledge, such as learning 
opportunities (e.g. ‘fresh eyes’, ‘new thinking’), as an important yet somehow overlooked outcome 
in the contracting literature. Learning is a key strategic driver in inter-organisational co-operations, 
which contrasts with strategic drivers rooted in cost concerns (Child et al., 2005). Conversely, 
outcomes related to democratic and legal performance apparently matter little to our sample of 
managers. This is in contrast to the early critique of contracting out for ‘hollowing out’ the 
functions of government (Rhodes, 1994) and the lack of deliberation in New Public Management-
oriented approaches to contracting out (Vincent-Jones, 2007). Our study thus sustains the more 
general point that the choice of stakeholder perspective is important for identifying and evaluating 
contracting outcomes. Further along these lines, public managers are found to be fully occupied 
with a range of outcomes that can be expected to be of less interest to other stakeholders. The 
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highlighted intricacies of dealing with daily management would most certainly be of little or no 
interest to service users and citizens. Service users would certainly be affected negatively in the 
long run if management becomes immersed in struggles with contractors over operational matters 
rather than being occupied with ensuring that services are fit for purpose. However, the analysis 
finds that, more positively, contracting out can contribute to improved management in terms of, for 
example, the more effective prioritisation of resources, stronger managerial controls and developing 
routines and methods. Similarly, it is worth noting that contracting out is highlighted as a way of 
serving political needs to demonstrate the sound use of economic resources through ‘market-prices’ 
and ‘benchmarks’, whereby service budgets are protected from politically motivated searches for 
cost savings. Our study also provides evidence of the potentially conflicting evaluation of key 
outcomes. All told, while contracting out has been associated with negative outcomes for 
employees (Vrangbæk et al., 2015), several public managers indicated that being released from 
internal staff management responsibilities was a positive outcome and improved the managerial 
focus (e.g. on more user-oriented core tasks). 
In a comparative perspective, services related to green space maintenance can be argued as 
relatively straightforward and ‘simple’ to contract out based on evaluations of their transactional 
characteristics (Brown and Potoski, 2005; Hefetz and Warner, 2012). Nevertheless, our study finds 
that contracting outcomes can be a ‘mixed bag’ for public managers with implementation 
responsibilities, even for ‘simple’ services. Implementing the contracting out of simple services 
may still be a daunting task for public managers in local governments, and the characteristics of 
parks and green space maintenance might not neatly fit the requirements for the effective use of 
contracting out, as some studies also have noted (Jang, 2006; Lindholst and Bogetoft, 2011). It can 
also be hypothesised that for services with more complex characteristics (e.g. those increasingly 
difficult to specify or demanding high investments), it would be relatively harder to achieve positive 
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outcomes, and negative outcomes would be even more pronounced. In sum, for more complex, 
‘high transaction cost’ services, it would be plausible to expect a relatively more challenging task to 
strike a favourable balance in the negative/positive outcomes mix. 
Compared to extant research that reports on contracting outcomes through sharp, theoretical 
or policy-oriented lenses, our study provides a more open and vivid portrait from the public 
manager perspective. More particularly, our study provides important nuances for understanding 
contracting outcomes in terms of variations, complexities and trade-offs. Furthermore, the complex-
case scenario does not fit well with typical ‘pro’ and ‘con’ or ‘proponents’ versus the ‘critics’ 
positions used to motivate much of the research on contracting outcomes. One of our key findings is 
that upsides come with downsides of different kinds across a service sector. In this respect, the 
findings are more closely aligned with earlier qualitative, case-based studies emphasising multiple 
performance dimensions (e.g. Romzek and Johnson, 2005) than quantitative assessments of a single 
dimension (e.g. Alonso et al., 2017). Our findings will hopefully inspire future research to include a 
broader focus on the many outcomes of contacting out. For example, as economic returns from 
continued exposure to competition diminish (e.g. Petersen et al., 2017) – when in-house or private 
delivery of services is provided at cost-efficient levels – evaluations of contracting outcomes in 
terms of cost savings might simply be the wrong focus vis-à-vis the underlying realities. The 
economic accountability of the overall service delivery system, service quality and/or organisational 
development might be more relevant outcomes to evaluate in such scenarios. Research supports 
these arguments, which indicates the necessity to see contracting as a strategic practice designed 
and undertaken by local authorities to serve different purposes over time (Brown et al., 2006; 
Lindholst and Bogetoft, 2011; Warner and Hefetz, 2012) as well as research (e.g. Bel et al., 2007, 
2010), which indicates the necessity to take contextual contingencies further into account when 
evaluating contracting outcomes. 
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Conclusions 
Our study provides an explorative, ‘grounded’ portrait of how public managers assess outcomes 
from the contracting out of green space maintenance within the municipal park sector in Denmark 
and Sweden. The portrait adds important nuances to the current understanding of outcomes and 
supports the use of multidimensional conceptualisations of contracting outcomes while also 
indicating that insights can be gained from accommodating evaluations from the stakeholder 
viewpoint. Our findings can be summarised in three scenarios that stylise certain characteristics of 
contracting outcomes within a most-likely context for effective use of contracting out. A best-case 
scenario captures the promises of contracting out by summarising all of the positive outcomes. Key 
outcomes in the best-case scenario are cost reductions and the improved use of resources, improved 
economic accountability, better information for decision-making and more effective maintenance 
operations management, together with organisational innovation and development. Conversely, a 
worst-case scenario captures the pitfalls and drawbacks of contracting by summarising all of the 
negative outcomes. Key outcomes in the worst-case scenario are failing quality in service provision, 
increased overall costs, inflexible service provision, expensive costs for adjustments, increased 
monitoring costs, loss of knowledge about services for planning and management, ongoing and 
burdensome disputes with contractors and poor collaborative relations. The best-case and worst-
case scenarios are mere abstractions based on summaries of, respectively, the positive and negative 
outcomes. They form the endpoints in a continuum between attractive and unattractive outcomes. 
Between the two extremes, we highlight a complex-case scenario that captures contracting 
outcomes as a complex set of trade-offs and interrelated negative and positive outcomes. We 
believe that highlighting the complex and composite nature of contracting outcomes best captures 
the realities of contracting out in the public sector. The implications for further research on 
contracting outcomes are obvious. 
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Appendix  
The total survey response rate was moderate in Denmark (57%; 56 out of 98 municipalities), and 
low in Sweden (16%; 46 of 290). The low Swedish response rate must be assessed against a 
municipal structure including a very high number of smaller municipalities (137 municipalities < 
15,000 inhabitants), many of which have very limited responsibilities for parks and green spaces 
(Randrup and Persson, 2009). In contrast, only six Danish municipalities have fewer than 15,000 
inhabitants. The 56 Danish responses represent urban green space management in municipalities 
accounting for approximately 62% (3,500,000) of all Danish citizens, whereas the 46 Swedish 
responses represent urban green space management in municipalities accounting for approximately 
40% (or 4,000,000) of all Swedish citizens. In Denmark, responses from 45 of the 56 municipalities 
(80%) indicated that they contracted out to some degree. In Sweden, responses from 26 of the 46 
municipalities (57%) indicated that they contracted out to some degree. The percentages correspond 
roughly to findings in other studies (Bretzner et al. 2016; Lindholst et al. 2016). The dataset (based 
on the municipalities that contracted out to some degree and provided useful entries) included an 
almost equal distribution of municipalities within groups with lower (< 20%), medium (20–70%) 
and higher (> 70%) levels of contracting out in both countries. The average size of municipalities 
that provided useable survey entries was approximately 76,000 inhabitants for contracting and 
55,000 for non-contracting municipalities in Denmark (national average: 57,000 inhabitants) and 
141,000 inhabitants for contracting and 36,000 for non-contracting municipalities in Sweden 
(national average: 33,000 inhabitants). The difference in size between contracting and non-
contracting municipalities is significant at p-level < .05 for Sweden as well as the two countries 
combined, but non-significant for Denmark. Overall, the final dataset tends to represent accounts 
from managers in larger municipalities
30 
 
 Version accepted for publication in Planning and Environment C: Politics and Space 
References 
Alonso JM, Clifton J and Díaz-Fuentes D (2017) The impact of government outsourcing on public 
spending: Evidence from European Union countries. Journal of Policy Modeling 
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2017.01.007. 
Andersen LB, Boesen A and Pedersen LH (2016) Performance in public organizations: Clarifying 
the conceptual space. Public Administration Review 76(6): 852‒862. 
Andrews R and Van De Welle S (2013) New Public Management and citizens’ perceptions of local 
service efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness. Public Management Review 
15(5): 762‒783. 
Amirkhanyan AA, Kim HJ and Lambright KT (2007) Putting the pieces together: A comprehensive 
framework for understanding the decision to contract out and contractor performance. 
International Journal of Public Administration 30(6): 699‒725. 
Amirkhanyan AA, Kim HJ and Lambright KT (2010) Do relationships matter? Assessing the 
association between relationship design and contractor performance. Public Performance 
and Management Review 34(2): 189‒220. 
Bel G, Hebdon R and Warner M (2007) Local government reform: Privatisation and its alternatives. 
Local Government Studies 33(4): 507‒515. 
Bel G, Fageda X and Warner ME (2010) Is private production of public services cheaper than 
public production? A meta-regression analysis of solid waste and water services. Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 29(3): 553‒577. 
Boyne GA (1998) Public Choice and Local Government: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and 
the USA. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Boyne GA (2002) Concepts and indicators of local authority performance: An evaluation of the 
statutory frameworks in England and Wales. Public Money and Management 22(2): 17‒24. 
Boyne GA, Meier KJ, O’Toole LJ Jr and Walker RM (2006) Public management and organizational 
performance: An agenda for research. In: Boyne GA, Meier KJ, O’Toole Jr LJ and Walker 
RM (eds) Public Service Performance: Perspectives on Measurement and Management. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 295‒311. 
Brewer GA (2006) All measures of performance are subjective: More evidence on US federal 
agencies in public service performance. In Boyne GA, Meier KJ, O’Toole Jr. LJ and Walker 
RM (eds) Public Service Performance: Perspectives on Measurement and Management. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 35‒54. 
31 
 
 Version accepted for publication in Planning and Environment C: Politics and Space 
Bretzner YN, Randrup TB and Persson B (2016) Do public procurement cost efficiency depend on 
market types? A critical test in park and road sectors in Sweden. International Journal of 
Public Sector Management 29(5): 488‒501. 
Brooks J, McCluskey S, Turley E and King N (2015) The utility of template analysis in qualitative 
psychology research. Qualitative Research in Psychology 12(2): 202‒222. 
Brown TL and Potoski M (2003) Contract-management capacity in municipal and county 
governments. Public Administration Review 63(2): 153‒164. 
Brown TL and Potoski M (2005) Transaction costs and contracting: The practitioner 
perspective. Public Performance and Management Review 38(3): 326‒351. 
Brown TL, Potoski M and Van Slyke DM (2006) Managing public service contracts: Aligning 
values, institutions, and markets. Public Administration Review 66(3): 323‒331. 
Bryman A (2012) Social Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bryntse K and Greve C (2002) Competitive contracting for public services: A comparison of 
policies and implementation in Denmark and Sweden. International Public Management 
Review 3(1): 1‒21. 
Child J, Faulkner D and Tallman S (2005) Cooperative Strategy: Managing Alliances, Networks 
and Joint Ventures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cuganesan S, Guthrie J and Vranic V (2014) The riskiness of public sector performance 
measurement: A review and research agenda. Financial Accountability and Management 
30(3): 279‒302. 
Davis RS, Girth AM and Stazyk EC (2016) Social and technical determinants of perceived contract 
performance: Rules, autonomy, and ethics. Public Performance & Management Review 
39(3): 728‒755. 
Dempsey N and Burton M (2012) Defining place-keeping: The long-term management of public 
spaces. Urban Forestry & Urban Greening 11(1): 11‒20. 
Domberger S and Jensen P (1997) Contracting out by the public sector: Theory, evidence, 
prospects. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 13(4): 67‒78. 
Donahue JD (1989) The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Fernandez S (2009) Understanding contracting performance: An empirical analysis. Administration 
and Society 41(1): 67‒100. 
Fowler FJJ (2009) Survey Research Methods, 4th ed. London: Sage. 
32 
 
 Version accepted for publication in Planning and Environment C: Politics and Space 
Glaser BG and Strauss AL (2006) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research. London: Transaction. 
Hansen MB (2010a) Privatisering, demokrati og magt i de danske kommuner. Politica 42(2): 183‒
201. 
Hansen MB (2010b) Marketization and economic performance. Public Management Review 12(2): 
255‒274. 
Hansen MB (2017) Performance management and evaluation. In: Greve B (ed) Handbook of Social 
Policy Evaluation. Cheltenham: Edgar Elwin, pp. 223‒241. 
Hansen MB and Lindholst AC (2016) Marketization revisited. International Journal of Public 
Sector Management 29(5): 398‒408. 
Hart O, Shleifer A and Vishny RW (1997) The proper scope of government: Theory and an 
application to prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1127‒1161. 
Hefetz A and Warner ME (2012) Contracting or public delivery? The importance of service, 
market, and management characteristics. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 22(2): 289‒317. 
Hodge GA (2000) Privatization: An International Review of Performance. Oxford: Boulder 
Westview. 
Hodge GA and Coghill K (2007) Accountability in the privatized state. Governance 20(4): 675‒
702. 
Hood C (1991) A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, 69(1): 3‒19. 
Hood C (1998) The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Jang H (2006) Contracting out parks and recreation services: Correcting for selection bias using 
a Heckman selection model. International Journal of Public Administration 29(10/11): 799‒
818. 
Jones R (2000) Managing the green spaces: Problems of maintaining quality in a local government 
service department. Managing Service Quality 10(1): 19‒31. 
Kettl DF (1993) Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets. Washington: The 
Brookings Institution. 
Kettl DF (2010) Governance, Contract Management and Public Management. In: Osborne SP (ed.) 
New Public Governance? Oxon: Routledge, pp. 239‒254. 
33 
 
 Version accepted for publication in Planning and Environment C: Politics and Space 
King N (2004) Using templates in the thematic analysis of text. In: Cassell C and Symon G (eds) 
Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research. London: Sage, pp. 
256‒287. 
Lamothe M and Lamothe S (2010) Competing for what? The American Review of Public 
Administration 40(3): 326‒350. 
Lindholst AC (2017) A review of the outcomes from contracting out urban green space 
maintenance: What we know, don’t know and should know. Urban Forestry & Urban 
Greening 27(October): 50‒58. 
Lindholst AC and Bogetoft P (2011) Managerial Challenges in Public Service Contracting: Lessons 
in Green-Space Management. Public Administration 89(3): 1036‒1062. 
Lindholst AC, Hansen MB and Petersen OH (2016) Marketization trajectories in the Danish road 
and park sectors: A story of incremental institutional change. International Journal of 
Public Sector Management 29(5): 457‒473. 
Lundqvist LJ (1989) The literature on privatization. Scandinavian Political Studies 12(3): 271‒277. 
MEA (2005) Millennium Assessment Report. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. 
Washington DC: Island Press. 
Mulgan R (2006) Government accountability for outsourced services. Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 65(2): 48‒58. 
Nuppenau C (2009) Marketizing Municipal Park Management Organisations in Denmark: A Study 
of Policymaking and Organisational Change in the Period 1985‒2005. Frederiksberg: 
University of Copenhagen. 
O’Flynn J and Alford J (2008) The separation/specification dilemma in contracting: The local 
government experience in Victoria. Public Administration 86(1): 205‒224.  
Patterson A and Pinch PL (1995) Hollowing out the local state: Compulsory competitive tendering 
and the restructuring of British public-sector services. Environment and Planning 27(9): 
1437‒1461. 
Petersen OH Hjelmar U and Houlberg K (2017) Is contracting out of public services still the great 
panacea? A systematic review of studies on economic and quality effects from 2000 to 
2014. Social Policy and Administration (doi:10.1111/spol.12297). 
Pollitt C and Bouckaert G (2011) Public Management Reform: Comparative Analysis of New 
Public Management, Governance and the Neo-Weberian State. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
34 
 
 Version accepted for publication in Planning and Environment C: Politics and Space 
Radin B (2006) Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability, Complexity, and 
Democratic Values. Washington: Georgetown University Press. 
Randrup TB and Persson B (2009) Public green spaces in the Nordic countries: Development of a 
new strategic management regime. Urban Forestry and Urban Greening 8(1): 31‒40. 
Rhodes RAW (1994) The hollowing out of the state: The changing nature of the public-service in 
Britain. Political Quarterly 65(2): 138‒151. 
Romzek BS and Johnston JM (2002) Effective contract implementation and management: A 
preliminary model. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 12(3): 423‒453. 
Romzek BS and Johnston JM (2005) State social services contracting: Exploring the determinants 
of effective contract accountability. Public Administration Review 65(4): 436‒449. 
Schachter H (2010) Objective and subjective performance measures: A note on terminology. 
Administration and Society 42(5): 550‒567. 
Vincent-Jones P (2007) The new public contracting: Public versus private ordering? Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 14(2): 259‒278. 
Vrangbæk K, Petersen OH and Hjelmar U (2015) Is contracting out good or bad for employees? A 
systematic review of international experience. Review of Public Personnel Administration 
35(1): 3‒23. 
Walker RM and Andrews R (2015) Local government management and performance: A review of 
evidence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 25(1): 101‒133. 
Warner ME and Hefetz A (2012) Insourcing and outsourcing. Journal of the American Planning 
Association 78(3): 313‒327. 
Yang K, Hsieh JY and Li TS (2009) Contracting capacity and perceived contracting performance: 
Nonlinear effects and the role of time. Public Administration Review 69(4): 681‒696.
35 
 
 Version accepted for publication in Planning and Environment C: Politics and Space 
 
Table 1. Final template for text analysis 
Background 
codes Sub-codes 
Country • Denmark 
• Sweden 
Direction of 
evaluation 
• Positive outcome 
• Negative outcome 
Main codes Sub-codes Examples of coded text 
Economic 
outcomes 
• Price/cost levels 
• Transaction costs 
• Accountability  
• Resource use 
• ‘Costs have decreased compared to in-house provision’ 
• ‘Control often requires more than in-house provision’ 
• ‘You can compare our own provision with private contractors’ 
• ‘Contractors can use machines and expertise more efficiently’ 
Service outcomes 
• Quality of maintenance services 
• Citizen feedback 
• Development 
• Social services 
• ‘Cost savings from procurement often imply permanent reductions in quality’ 
• ‘More citizen complaints’ 
• ‘Development of areas is lost’ 
• ‘Fewer opportunities to include youth work and vocational training’ 
Managerial 
outcomes 
• Managerial effectiveness  
• Management information  
• Managerial focus 
• ‘We get the maintenance we order’ 
• ‘Improved land use registration’ 
• ‘Inspections instead of visions’ 
Organisational 
outcomes  
• Staff 
• Knowledge 
• Motivations 
Quality of relationships 
• ‘Frustrations and insecurity among transferred employees’ 
• ‘Knowledge about areas disappears due to increased staff turnover’ 
• ‘An in-house provider has more sense of ownership and does that little “extra”’ 
• ‘Very negative that contractors can’t stay for very long’ 
Note: The template provides an overview over background codes, main codes, sub-codes and examples of coded text. 
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Table 2. Frequencies for coded contracting outcomes. 
 Instances of outcomes 
Positive  Negative Total 
Economic outcomes 57 (in 43 cases) 35 (28) 92 
 Price/cost levels 16 8 24 
 Transaction costs 0 21 21 
 Accountability (for costs) 22 6 28 
 Resource use 19 1 20 
Service outcomes 4 (in 4 cases) 20 (17) 24 
 Maintenance quality 3 13 16 
 Citizen feedback 0 4 4 
 Development of areas 1 2 3 
 Social services 0 1 1 
Managerial outcomes 35 (in 25 cases) 45 (34) 80 
 Effectiveness 15 27 42 
 Focus 8 12 20 
 Information 12 6 18 
Organisational outcomes 23 (in 19 cases) 39 (27) 62 
 Staff 0 5 5 
 Knowledge 18 14 32 
 Motivation 1 2 3 
 Quality of relations 4 18 22 
Note: The table shows the frequencies a particular outcome were coded (instances) in the dataset at the level of main 
codes and sub-codes. A case (i.e. a municipality) typically reported several outcomes across the various types of main 
outcomes.  
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Table 3: Summary of findings: Contracting outcomes between two extremes 
 Best-case scenario Complex-case scenario Worst-case scenario 
Economic 
outcomes 
Cost savings, improved economic 
accountability, more efficient use of 
specialised expertise and machinery. 
Costs for standard operations reduced 
while costs for non-standard operations 
increased. Costs reduced but at expense 
of service quality levels. Transaction costs 
offset gains from cost savings on service 
provision. 
Increased overall costs.  
Expensive adjustments. Increased 
monitoring costs. 
Service 
outcomes 
Consistent service quality, improvements 
through reinvestment. 
Accountability on service quality is 
reduced while accountability on 
price/cost levels is improved. 
Declining or failing service quality. Lack of 
reinvestment. 
Managerial 
outcomes 
More effective management. Improved 
strategic and operational management. 
Improved effectiveness of contract 
management is limited by lack of internal 
resources. 
Inflexible service provision. Lack of 
internal resources for contract 
management. 
Organisational 
outcomes 
Access to specialised expertise. 
Innovation and improved organisational 
routines and work methods. 
Loss of operational knowledge organised 
in-house, but introduction of new 
knowledge through collaboration with 
private contractors. Collaboration framed 
and challenged by time-limited 
contractual relations. 
Loss of key knowledge for planning and 
management about maintenance 
operations. 
Ongoing, burdensome disputes with 
contractors, poor contractual relations. 
 
  
38 
 
